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Analysis of the August 2021 Taliban takeover in Afghanistan - Printable Version

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Analysis of the August 2021 Taliban takeover in Afghanistan - Rako - 09-03-2021 12:53 PM

Quote:Aug. 14, 2021, NYT

KABUL, Afghanistan — The last major city in northern Afghanistan fell to the Taliban on Saturday night, marking the complete loss of the country’s north to the Taliban as the insurgents appear on the verge of a full military takeover.
The Taliban seized Mazar-i-Sharif, the last northern holdout city, barely an hour after breaking through the front lines at the city’s edge. Soon after, government security forces and militias fled — including those led by the infamous [note that "infamous" is the NYT's interpretation] warlords Marshal Abdul Rashid Dostum and Atta Muhammad Noor — effectively handing control to the insurgents.

“Government forces and popular uprisings all left the city,” said Hashim Ahmadzai, a pro-government militia commander. “The Taliban seized government and military buildings. There was no resistance.”

[Image: afghanistan-maps-taliban-promo-162896456...t2X-v3.jpg]

For weeks, the government and militia forces had fortified the city’s defenses and manned them with fresh batches of newly recruited fighters. But on Saturday night, the city fell without a fight, causing many to speculate that the government or militia commanders had struck a deal to surrender the city to the Taliban.

With the fall of Mazar-i-Sharif, the only two major cities left under government control are Kabul and Jalalabad, the capital of Nangarhar Province in the eastern part of the country.

The loss of the north — once the heart of resistance to the insurgents’ rise to power in 1996 — to the Taliban offered a devastating blow to morale for a country gripped with panic.

Quote:Taliban capture key northern city, approach Afghan capital
August 14, 2021

The fall of Mazar-e-Sharif, the country’s fourth largest city, which Afghan forces and two powerful former warlords had pledged to defend, hands the insurgents control over all of northern Afghanistan, confining the Western-backed government to the center and east.

Abas Ebrahimzada, a lawmaker from the Balkh province where the city is located, said the national army surrendered first, which prompted pro-government militias and other forces to lose morale and give up in the face of a Taliban onslaught launched earlier Saturday.

Ebrahimzada said Abdul Rashid Dostum and Ata Mohammad Noor, former warlords who command thousands of fighters, had fled the province and their whereabouts were unknown.

Noor said in a Facebook post that his defeat in Mazar-e-Sharif was orchestrated and blamed the government forces, saying they handed their weapons and equipment to the Taliban. He did not say who was behind the conspiracy, nor offer details, but said he and Dostum “are in a safe place now”
Mazar-e-Sharif, home to a famous blue-tiled Muslim shrine, was a stronghold of the Northern Alliance, ethnic militias who helped the U.S. topple the Taliban in 2001.

In 1997, as many as 2,000 Taliban fighters were captured and killed by forces loyal to Mohammed Mohaqiq, a Shiite Hazara leader, and his ethnic Uzbek allies. The following year, the Taliban returned and killed thousands of Hazaras in Mazar-e-Sharif in a revenge attack.


[Image: g_9oK0kv1nnvDcZgWENOQ6I5i_YLdnheEzGPQ6X0...gZ2rpzRW6Q]

So the National Afghan army was surrendering even though the regional militias in the north didn't want to join the Taliban.

[Image: fb-img-1578460036813.jpg]
Blue Shrine, Mazar i Sherif

[Image: _96531481_885d7c3d-d91e-4015-ab60-26f3c3e91d01.jpg]
Mazar i Sherif military base. I'm guessing that this is a Soviet-era BMP tank.

[Image: 1996afghan_%281%29.png]
1996 Militia map showing the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance, which was made up of the red and green forces on the map.

Schota Apchaidze in his RT article theorizes that the decision to remove troops from Afghanistan is based on Robert Gilpin's Hegemonic Stability Theory, in which instability reigns in places from which the "Hegemon" (in this case the US) is absent.

The article says that the current Taliban-imposed ruler over Afghanistan is Abdul Gani Baradar, the deputy leader of the Taliban, the current Taliban leader being Akhundzadi. Both of these two Taliban leaders cooperated with the Pentagon in fighting ISIL and Trump personally asked Pakistan to release Baradar from prison less than three years ago.

The article has a section called the Panjshir Option about how the US and Britain support the son of the famous anti-Taliban fighter Massoud, his son also being called Massoud. The article suggests that the younger Massoud is a backup partner and that he is building forces in the Panjshir valley, not necessarily to have a full war with the Taliban but to put pressure that guides the development of the country's governance into an inclusive direction. Further, the author thinks that there is not much chance of realistic success for the younger Massoud to win against the Taliban.
But if the Taliban makes conflicts with the US worse, the anti-Taliban forces can have more hope for help from the US.
Quote:In this regard, the visit to Panjshir of the globalist-philosopher Bernard-Henri Levy, who is the gray cardinal of American "democracy for export", is symbolic. Levy's visit and his support for the resistance leader Ahmad Shah Massoud Jr. can be assessed as solidarity of the collective West. Washington and its allies are now counting on the fact that the Taliban may well agree to discuss compromise figures who will enter the new government. Thus, the White House and Buckingham Palace, having de facto renounced control over Afghanistan, continue to claim leading roles in shaping the domestic political agenda through constructive interaction with the Panjshir leaders.
Whether the decision of the Americans to leave Afghanistan was a strategic mistake or, conversely, a far-sighted calculation, time will tell.

RE: Analysis of the August 2021 Taliban takeover in Afghanistan - pilgrim - 09-03-2021 02:04 PM

Appreciate the analysis, rako. Maybe I'm being selfish but I kind of want to put Afghanistan in the rear view mirror. That war needed to end but Biden didn't end it properly. Other than that I'm glad we're out of there.

RE: Analysis of the August 2021 Taliban takeover in Afghanistan - Rako - 09-03-2021 03:01 PM

An article on the Meduza website called "The article, of which there wasn't enough for all of us" (Статья, которой нам всем так не хватало) says that the Taliban "softened" its practices or politics due in part to the Trump administration de facto giving it recognition in Feb. 2020. (https://meduza.io/feature/2021/08/19/statya-kotoroy-nam-vsem-tak-ne-hvatalo-stydnye-na-samom-dele-vovse-net-voprosy-o-talibane)

The Taliban did not give up its Fundamentalist ideology per se, but rather in negotiations with the US it agreed to eject terrorists like Al Qaida from its territory, which had been one of the original goals of the US invasion since 2001. It was agreement with America that led to a partial softening of the Taliban's practices.

[Image: c2cuanBn.webp]
Taliban warrior on Kabul's streets, Aug. 2021

However, the article thinks that the Taliban can go back to its old ways, considering that in places away from Kabul, the Talibs act like they did in the 1990's.

It says that Pakistan set up the Taliban in the 1990's and that the Taliban's roots were in the Mujihadeen that Pakistan supplied in many ways (with intelligence, provisions, etc) in the 1980's against the Soviets.

In the 2000's, Pakistan agreed with the US to stop aiding the Taliban, but the US quickly realized that Pakistan was continuing to help the Taliban. There were a couple reasons for this according to US journalist Steven Koll. One reason was that Pakistan still wanted a Pashtun government to rule Afghanistan that would be under Pakistan's control. Plus, part of Pakistan's intelligence shares the Taliban's ideology and religious views.

However, the US didn't want to get into a war with Pakistan, one reason being that Pakistan was a US ally in Asia. So the US had to fight Pakistani "proxies" in Afghanistan and in Pakistan while maintaining its relations with Pakistan. The article notes that these "rules of the game" lasted until 2017, when Trump accused Pakistan of helping the Taliban and cut off military aid to Pakistan. Plus, now Pakistan is complaining that the US didn't consult with the Pakistanis about turning over control of Afghanistan to the Taliban.

There is also the confusing factor that there is a "Taliban" group in Pakistan called TTP that is fighting the Pakistani government while also supporting the Taliban in Afghanistan. Pakistan accuses India of helping them.

According to surveys, the Taliban has only 15% support among the population and are seen as unemployed youths and religious fanatics, but the poll numbers can be lower than reality because the polls might over-represent government held areas. Further, the federal non-Taliban government didn't come back with positive results in surveys either.

RE: Analysis of the August 2021 Taliban takeover in Afghanistan - Rako - 09-03-2021 03:13 PM

(09-03-2021 02:04 PM)pilgrim Wrote:  Appreciate the analysis, rako. Maybe I'm being selfish but I kind of want to put Afghanistan in the rear view mirror. That war needed to end but Biden didn't end it properly. Other than that I'm glad we're out of there.
It is kind of surprising for me that the national army folded so quickly.
There is information that the US was negotiating with the Taliban for a handover of power, like in negotiations in Qatar.

To justify the US occupation, one would have to rely on the official 2001 events' narrative. The story of the Taliban's possible responsibility for the 2001 events is weird and mysterious. IIRC, the Taliban generally did not approve of the attacks, but they didn't want to hand over Bin Laden. Then there is the controversy over whether and how many of the Bin Laden videos are fakes.

If one were to disagree with the US invasion, it still could make sense for the US or UN to help various Afghan forces like the Northern Alliance. In other words, US indirect intervention in some form could be justified in the Afghan civil war. This would be different than the Libyan or Syrian Civil Wars, where the US has taken a direct role.

RE: Analysis of the August 2021 Taliban takeover in Afghanistan - Rako - 09-03-2021 03:15 PM

One relevant quote from the Meduza article is about how Afghanis in surveys answered questions related to the Taliban:
  • "Almost half of the respondents were satisfied with the beginning of the withdrawal of foreign troops from the country (some replied that they “don't care”). At the same time, more than a third of those who replied in 2020 feared that this would lead to the establishment of Taliban power or to an intensification of hostilities. The same number believed that the Afghan army would cope with the Taliban."
  • "More than 80% of those surveyed opposed forced weddings for teenage girls and similar customs. More than three quarters of the respondents said that women should have equal rights with men to education and work."
  • "The respondents named discipline and internal unity as positive qualities of the Taliban. They noted their (ie. the Taliban's) readiness to achieve their goal by violence."

Another quote is about the incompetence of the Afghan army.

Quote:The Pentagon knew in advance that the Afghan National Army was unlikely to be able to repel the Taliban without American help, follows from the reports of the SIGAR group, created by the US military to audit the Afghan military program and spending on the reconstruction of the country. In short, the main reasons why the Afghan army did not emerge as a fighting force are as follows:

----- Initially, it was planned to build a small professional army in Afghanistan. However, the ongoing war with the Taliban demanded large resources - first of all, not for participation in battles, but for routine control over the situation in various parts of the country. This led to a manifold growth of the army in the late 2000s.
In the 2010s, the same story was repeated with the creation of the national police - a rapid growth in the number with a constant decline in the quality of conscripts and their training.
----- People were taken into the army not so that they learn to fight and fight, but so that they receive money. So, from 2010 to 2020, the size of the army increased by 80% - up to 185 thousand people. Moreover, the costs (including temporary) for the training of military personnel have decreased.
----- The composition of the army changed by 25% every year.
----- The servicemen considered the army a feeding trough. The theft compensated them for low wages and delays in their payments. When the US military introduced an electronic inventory control system for the Afghan army, its numbers quickly dropped by 56,000.
----- Failed to massively create inter-tribal units. Basically, the army was formed along tribal lines. The soldiers were subordinate to the tribal commander. When the Taliban's decisive offensive began, many commanders simply joined the future victors.

Russia declared the Taliban a terrorist organization in 2003, but the US and UN never declared the Taliban to be a terrorist organization despite the US invasion and US sanctions against them. Beginning in 2018, Russia had official contacts with the Taliban and tried to get the UN to drop sanctions from them.
SOURCE: https://meduza.io/feature/2021/08/19/statya-kotoroy-nam-vsem-tak-ne-hvatalo-stydnye-na-samom-dele-vovse-net-voprosy-o-talibane

RE: Analysis of the August 2021 Taliban takeover in Afghanistan - Rako - 09-03-2021 03:56 PM


Coalition Urges Congress to Expand Scope of Afghanistan Investigations or Risk Another Disastrous War Effort

WASHINGTON, DC — Last night, a coalition of national organizations sent a letter to the leaders of the House Foreign Affairs and Senate Foreign Relations Committees urging them to expand the scope of their investigations into the war in Afghanistan. The letter comes in response to reports that these committees intend to focus their oversight exclusively on the recent withdrawal, and do not plan to investigate the significant issues that plagued America’s 20-year war effort in Afghanistan. Representatives from the groups offered the following statements on their efforts:

“Focusing Congress’ considerable investigatory resources on the withdrawal alone is a dangerous mistake,” said Adam Weinstein, Research Fellow at the Quincy Institute. “The American people deserve a full accounting of the 20 years of lies and bad policies—advanced by American leaders—that sustained our failed nation-building exercise and set the conditions for a chaotic withdrawal; if Congress does not interrogate the root causes of the failures in our policy toward Afghanistan, we are doomed to repeat them.”

RE: Analysis of the August 2021 Taliban takeover in Afghanistan - Rako - 09-03-2021 04:04 PM

Quote:A Trillion Dollar Illusion
The Entirely Predictable Failure of the West's Mission in Afghanistan
In early July, I met with a leading Taliban military commander. I asked when his fighters would arrive in Kabul. His answer: "They are already there." How the Afghanistan mission failed and what happens next.
By Christoph Reuter
20.08.2021, 18.49 Uhr

In early July, before the great storm broke over Afghanistan, Kabul was already surrounded by the Taliban. And nowhere were the Islamist fighters closer to the Afghan capital city than on the shores of the Qargha Reservoir, a popular getaway on the western edge of the city. People were saying that the Taliban had gathered in the villages behind the nearby hills. The last frontline, it was said, was on the shore of the reservoir at the amusement park.

During the day, families were still taking their children to the rides and the restaurants or going out on the water in swan-shaped paddle boats. A small, six-member special forces unit even enjoyed a picnic in a wooden pavilion on the shore. One of them had to stand guard at the gun turret of their armored Humvee as the rest smoked hookahs and drank colorful sodas.

The next day, I met one of the Taliban’s leading military commanders for Kabul, who received me in the middle of the city in an unremarkable office building. When asked how far the Taliban had to walk to get to the lakeshore, he responded: "Not far at all." He seemed perfectly calm, a clean-shaven emissary of fear. "They’re already there, after all. They are the security guards at the restaurants, the ride operators, the cleaning staff. When the time is right, the place will be full of Taliban."

Six weeks after our meeting, in the middle of August, the same man drove to the Presidential Palace along with 10 bodyguards and the senior commander responsible for the conquering of Kabul. He hadn’t lied when he said that his men had already infiltrated the park at the reservoir. What he had failed to mention, though, was that the Taliban were also already in the heart of the city.

Numerous witnesses in various neighborhoods of the capital following the fall of Kabul had similar stories to tell. "It started in April," says a longtime acquaintance from the western part of the city. "More and more outsiders were suddenly in the neighborhood. Some had beards, others didn’t. Some were well dressed, others wore rags. Completely different. That made them difficult to notice. But all of the locals realized: They aren’t from here." They had silently infiltrated Kabul. The outsiders also appeared in the northern and eastern parts of the city, telling those who asked that they had come to Kabul for a new job or for business reasons.

Then, last Sunday morning, "they came out of the buildings holding white Taliban flags, some of them armed with pistols," says a resident of an eastern district of the city. It was the ultimate victory over America’s high-tech military, whose air surveillance proved powerless against this army of pedestrians and motorcyclists that would overrun Kabul from within and from outside in the ensuing hours. Later that day, they would drive through the city streets in captured police cars – from the air, an image of perfect confusion.


From the article:
[Image: 7084ff38-0002-0004-0000-0000fb892085_w99...y49.97.jpg]
People wanting to leave

RE: Analysis of the August 2021 Taliban takeover in Afghanistan - EVILYOSHIDA - 09-03-2021 04:20 PM

It's just a bullshit scripted event, where real people get hurt/injured killed and displaced.
if you want to do a transfer of power there are much better way to do this.
It is not ineptitude.

RE: Analysis of the August 2021 Taliban takeover in Afghanistan - Megatherium - 09-03-2021 08:37 PM

'The generals and the congress bullshitted about what was going on in Afghanistan for twenty years.'

RE: Analysis of the August 2021 Taliban takeover in Afghanistan - Rako - 09-04-2021 01:36 AM

(09-03-2021 04:20 PM)EVILYOSHIDA Wrote:  It's just a bullshit scripted event, where real people get hurt/injured killed and displaced.
if you want to do a transfer of power there are much better way to do this.
It is not ineptitude.
Tell me more.

When you say that there are better ways to do this, do you mean like having a mix of Arab and UN security forces in Kabul?

One hypothesis could be that they don't want especially for the Taliban to take over, but the Taliban are stronger and more competent than Afghan government forces, and the US wants to leave, so they are stuck with the Taliban being the ones who do the take over. In that case, one reason that they don't want an official hand over of power could be that they might not be sure that they want the Taliban to take over long term, and an official hand over would solidify the Taliban's grip. Meanwhile, they can be keeping Massoud and other resistance forces in their pocket as a backup.

On the other hand, there are some signs or reasons why they could be OK with the Taliban taking over, depending on how the Taliban acts in government. One reason is that the US is OK with the Saudis being in power, and the Saudis are Wahhabi and strict in a way comparable to the Taliban, although perhaps less so. Another is the US negotiations with the Taliban in Qatar where the Taliban agreed to reject Al Qaida. Another is Trump's personally getting the freedom of the Taliban leader who is set to head the new Taliban government of Afghanistan, Baradar, when Baradar was in prison in Pakistan.

RE: Analysis of the August 2021 Taliban takeover in Afghanistan - Rako - 09-04-2021 03:01 AM

Quote:Breaking: US military is finally out of Afghanistan
Our miltiary will circle their wagons around the huge numbers of people they got out

By Jim W. Dean, Managing Editor -August 30, 2021

Editor Jim Dean's note:
The UN has been signaling a humanitarian crisis via the Taliban having not experienced running a modern government. Its illiterate soldiers are not going to be much help. Left to its own resources with no technical competence, the economy would grind to a halt.
I am expecting the grifter politicians will try to exploit the withdrawal by bashing those involved in the heavy lifting. The Repubs have gone all in to make Biden the Tar Baby, and the US military and State Department with him. This will backfire when the dust settles.

Our military will circle their wagons around the huge numbers of people they got out, Biden abiding by the evacuation date, and now owning the success of getting out of that cash cow mess that made so many so rich at the cost of all those who got the short end of the stick, especially those that died fighting for a bad cause.


The VT article is citing the Washington Post:
Quote:“The last C-17 lifted off from Hamid Karzai International Airport on August 30th this afternoon at 3:29 p.m. East Coast time in the last manned aircraft is now clearing the airspace above Afghanistan.”
Xinhua news includes information from the Washington Post article and says:
Quote:While paying tribute to the 2,461 U.S. service members killed -- including the 13 troops lost Thursday to a terror attack aimed at sabotaging the evacuation mission -- and over 20,000 U.S. personnel injured during the longest war Washington has engaged in throughout history, McKenzie also told reporters that no American citizens managed to embark on the final five evacuation flights leaving Kabul, meaning there were still Americans wishing to depart the country that were left on ground.

"We maintained the ability to bring them in up until immediately before departure," McKenzie said. "We would have been prepared to bring them on until the very last minute, but none of them made it to the airport and were able to be accommodated," he added.

The general said the number of U.S. citizens currently still stranded in Afghanistan is "in the very low hundreds," stressing that the Department of State is now in charge of assisting those evacuees.

"The military's phase of this operation has ended ... The diplomatic sequel to that will now begin," he said, adding that the United States will continue trying to extract the remaining U.S. citizens and "negotiate very hard and aggressively" to get eligible Afghans to come to the United States.

Quote:The Afghanistan I Fought in for the U.S. Was Always a Lie
Adrian Bonenberger, Updated Aug. 17, 2021 5:00AM ET

With the benefit of hindsight, it seems more likely that what I saw in 2010 was an essential part of Afghanistan itself: how the country and culture survive the foreign ideas and nations that regularly sweep over it before receding.

That was not clear to me when I was in Afghanistan. I think the Afghanistan I was living in, which is the Afghanistan many Americans perceive or discuss to this day when they talk about things like cowardice or dishonor among the ANSF, was actually a vibrant fantasy world on par with that of Westeros or Middle Earth. Our Afghanistan, which resembled America in some senses, was a country where people fought to the death for their ideas, like we did in World War II.

Many Americans shared in the mass delusion: the people I deployed with, military leadership, the commentariat and political leaders. I don’t think many Afghans were taken in by the lie. Looking back on things, most of the Afghans I met used the lie opportunistically, as a way of getting something they wanted.
For the Taliban’s part, they’ve been trying to communicate the truth to us since 2001. They’re savage and unethical, barbaric, cruel, and objectionable in every possible sense — religious extremists to boot, the worst kind of people (people, though, in spite of it all). Their having been right, and our having been lying to ourselves, doesn’t make the Taliban good people, or us bad people. It does mean their vision of the world was grounded in realism, and sober facts, and our vision in the U.S. and the West can now safely and with certainty be consigned to the bonfire, or repurposed as military or political fiction.

That’s the only way to explain how a country—excuse me, a lie—vanished in a week.

I am doubtful about his view that the Taliban was more "realistic" or that their vision of the world is more "grounded in reality". They might have been more competent fighters or more skilled in politics or gotten more help from Pakistan.

The article continues:
Quote:We could send soldiers back to Afghanistan if we wanted. A lot of so-called experts and others are smugly nodding and saying “I said this would happen if we left” or “We have to go back” or “Abandoning the Afghan government is a betrayal.” A great many American servicemembers who have sacrificed or spilled blood or lost friends or family in Afghanistan over the last 20 years, and would do so again because if told to go we don’t ask why or how long, we pack their kit and deploy. But doing that would be a terrible idea and wouldn’t solve anything.
Right. I guess you could colonize them like the Europeans in South Africa but with more settlers. But that doesn't work well. You could also try integrating with them like the Russians and Chinese have done in Central Asia. But I think that Americans don't care enough to do that.

NEO – Why the Lie Machine is grinding Afghanistan into Dust
Gordon Duff, First published … August 18, 2012
He claims that the media is grinding the Taliban into dust by badmouthing them. I don't know. We are still in the first weeks of the Taliban taking power, so we could be seeing some stability and allowance of humanitarian liberal values, but that doesn't show whether it will last long. Further, with their background, I could put some credibility in reports being real of them doing bad things.

I just skimmed these:

Fall of another super power in Afghanistan
By Brig. General Asif H. Raja (Pakistani) -July 16, 2021
I am doubtful about the "hidden objectives" that this article gives, like denuclearizing Pakistan.
But other information in it looks interesting.
He is also suggesting that Pakistan was against the Taliban, at least in the more recent years.

Why the USA lose in Afghanistan?
By Brig. General Asif H. Raja -August 1, 2021

Afghanistan’s ‘dancing boy’ president flees country
The US has tried to represent the Pashtun population of Afghanistan as a minority, claiming they represent 30 to 40 percent of Afghanistan
By Gordon Duff, Senior Editor -August 15, 2021

CIA, Mossad & Talibans in Jihadist’s New Empire to Use Afghanistan against Iran and Russia
According to authoritative geopolitics analysts the US withdrawal is functional to the "Great Game" of Western Intelligence with Zionists and Sunnis already experienced in Syria and the Balkans
By Fabio Giuseppe Carlo Carisio -August 26, 2021

Jack Heart: Afghanistan – The Shadow of Evil
By Jack Heart -August 16, 2021
It is basically a repost of a 2013 article by Jack Heart that describes dark aspects of Pashtun culture and history that make it ungovernable.

The Pashtuns did have a king from the 1930's to the 1970's, which added stability for that period. I think it's not totally unmanageable for any ruler therefore. I think that they could have a king, for example. Another problem is the mix of religions and ethnicities that create conflicts between the tribes (eg. Shiite vs Sunni).

RE: Analysis of the August 2021 Taliban takeover in Afghanistan - rezin - 09-04-2021 03:19 PM

The best government Afghanistan ever had was under Mohammed Najibullah.

He succesfully governed Afghanistan after the Soviet withdrawal until Russia came under direct US control and stopped energy resources to Afghanistan.

As for an analysis of the current situation (why Afghan forces didn't even fight the talis), the Afghani army is under US control, once the US stopped issuing orders it all fell apart.

RE: Analysis of the August 2021 Taliban takeover in Afghanistan - EVILYOSHIDA - 09-04-2021 04:30 PM

(09-04-2021 03:19 PM)rezin Wrote:  The best government Afghanistan ever had was under Mohammed Najibullah.

He succesfully governed Afghanistan after the Soviet withdrawal until Russia came under direct US control and stopped energy resources to Afghanistan.

As for an analysis of the current situation (why Afghan forces didn't even fight the talis), the Afghani army is under US control, once the US stopped issuing orders it all fell apart.


RE: Analysis of the August 2021 Taliban takeover in Afghanistan - pilgrim - 09-05-2021 12:14 AM

[Image: efff153551f0cc176f8b209e739bf35a9dfc95ab.jpeg]

RE: Analysis of the August 2021 Taliban takeover in Afghanistan - Rako - 09-05-2021 04:35 AM

(09-05-2021 12:14 AM)pilgrim Wrote:  [Image: efff153551f0cc176f8b209e739bf35a9dfc95ab.jpeg]
This helps suggest a scripted event as a possibility, ie to deliberately make a disaster likely (a la Iran Hostage Crisis, 1970's). Alternately, the US had an arrangement with the Taliban to let the US civilians out, so they could have had some assurance that the Taliban would be reliable in letting the civilians out and wanted to test the Taliban.

US forces were not fighting the Taliban when the Taliban entered the city, AFAIK. Instead, the US had an agreement for a peaceful exchange of power. I guess if the US wanted to make sure civilians left first, they could have fought the Taliban in the defense of the city, kind of like the US fighting in Somalia in the 1990's when it was a chaotic disaster and they were trying to get US personnel out. but there was no defense, just surrender, in accordance with the US agreement with the Taliban.

Weird situation. On the surface, the Afghan army was way bigger than the Taliban but just incompetent and so it surrendered after losing the rural areas and after city after city surrendered.

In Mazar i Sherif, the Afghan army left and so the anti-Taliban regional forces just left too.

Weird situation.